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Falklands Conflict -- Again?
Since
the 1700s, a dispute over what country has
territorial rights to the Falkland Islands has
simmered and at times boiled over. Great Britain has
continued to reinforce its claim to the islands
while Latin America, mostly Argentina, has pressed
just as vehemently to its sovereignty over the area.
Negotiations over the islands -- called Islas
Malvinas in Spanish -- had their most recent flare
up in 1982. After Argentine forces occupied all key
points on the islands, British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher dispatched a large naval force to
the islands to recapture them. British landing
forces quickly retook the southern area of the main
island even while the Argentine Air Force bombed the
British vessels and sunk several. After five or so
months of fighting, the British forced the surrender
of the Argentine army in June, 1982.
Such a definitive end to the fighting in 1982 did
not end the dispute over whom should control the
country. Argentina claims it has a natural right to
the control as, they say, Argentine settlers are by
far the majority. The islands lie only a small
number of nautical miles from the Argentine
mainland. British control of the islands is a daily
reminder to the people of the colonial era and its
subsequent enforcement of a strange culture on
indigenous people. The British, of course have a
different opinion; they believe that the majority of
Falklanders are of British descent, and that the
majority prefer to live under the Union Flag.
Therefore, the questions remain: can armed conflict
over the islands begin again? Would Britain fight
again for control? Could they?
It has been suggested that one aspect of these
questions to consider is the willingness of
Argentina to fight a guerrilla war for control
instead of using conventional forces. As we all have
observed throughout much of military history, most
recently with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
guerrilla warfare can be devastating to an occupying
foreign force. With a relative minimum of fighters
and equipment, a guerrilla force can harass
occupiers over months and years, always avoiding
major conflict and continually retreating into
natural areas of defence or blending into the local
population, hiding weapons in secret storehouses and
making use of "soldiers" -- like boys and women --
who could prove to be effective shock troops. Any
British occupying force would have to seriously
weigh their resolve when faced with the protracted
years of guerrilla warfare. As any student of
history can describe, such lengthy conflicts often
result in the gradual loss of support from home.
Americans need only remember the Vietnam War for an
object lesson in how an unpopular war on foreign
soil can completely undermine a soldier's will to
fight and general morale. This would only work,
however, if the Argentine claims that the majority
of islanders support them was true, which manifestly
it is not and the British are confident that they
could rely upon the population to help them to find
and apprehend anyone involved in such actions.
A
more realistic facet to consider, however, is the
opinion and consequent support or lack thereof from
the world community, led by the United States. There
often seems to be a "do as I say, not as I do"
message from the U.S. The U.S. has strong reasons,
mostly having to do with commodities trading, to
keep the good will of their Latin American
neighbours. Great Britain, though a strong and
time-honoured Western European ally of the U.S.,
does not possess the same volume of goods vital to
the U.S. economy. The question of whether to favour
Argentine or British interests may tip in favour of
Argentina; therefore, Britain would risk much
world-wide disapproval and even condemnation if they
decided to invade the islands once again. Who knows
if Argentina may ask directly for aid from the U.S.?
At least, Argentina could ask for and form a Latin
American alliance against what they term "the
foreign invaders", then Britain would be risking
total war against countries such as Venezuela, Peru,
and Brazil merely to keep the Falklands British.
The preceding sentence begs the question: how
worthwhile is it to keep sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands? How many actual British citizens
reside on the islands? How much of a valuable
resource are the islands to the British people?
These and similar questions would probably, in these
days of stringent economy, be researched and
answered before the British decided to spend the
millions of pounds it would cost to steam across the
Atlantic with a flotilla of ships in the quest to
maintain the islands as a British possession. Yes,
Britain may still have the modern navy and landing
forces necessary to keep control of the islands
(subject to defence spending cuts of course; nothing
can be guaranteed these days), but would the people
and the economy support such an expedition? And
would today's British political leaders, who between
them have little or no military experience
whatsoever, have the stomach for a fight?
In all, the world has largely moved beyond notions
such as "manifest destiny" and the like. The British
Empire during the 19th century was huge and
unwieldy, like a house of cards built beyond what
the laws of physics and gravity can support. Just
like a toppling house of cards, the British Empire
lost the "cards" in its house as each fell to the
will of the native people. The United States, India,
Indo-China, and areas of the Africa and the Middle
East all have mostly moved away from their ties to
the old imperialist Britain. Would the Falkland
Islands eventually do the same? Then again; what
would the political consequences be for a government
that surrendered a colony which had been defended in
the past at the cost of so many brave men's lives?
Time
will tell. However, one thing we can be sure of:
this question is not likely to go away soon. And a
Britain which is content to allow it's defence
forces to be thrown onto the scrapheap whilst vast
sums of money are squandered on politically correct
projects that are actually against the country's
interests will have only itself to blame if the
Argentine flag once more flies over the Falkland
Islands. |